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Over the course of several decades the relationship between Japan and the EU has transformed from one 
focused on economics and trade into one that is a more comprehensive and ‘strategic partnership‘. This has 
been built on the EU and Japan sharing common values, principles and interests. It has also grown as a result 
of globalisation and the new security challenges that both have had to face, although the return of geopolitics 
could shift relations back towards traditional security.
This policy brief focuses on the political and security aspects of the EU-Japan relationship. Given Europe’s links 
to East Asia, the EU has a stake in East Asia‘s security in much the same way as East Asia has a stake in the security 
of Europe. This policy brief therefore asks whether Japan is a genuine partner for the EU in managing relations 
with the broader region of East Asia and whether Japan regards the EU to be a genuine strategic partner. 
Executive Summary*
Michael Reiterer
* Please note that this Policy Paper - due to the author‘s extraordinary expertise and experience in this topic - is 
longer than the other ones from this series. 
Policy Recommendations
  Early conclusion of the parallel negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement and Strategic Partnership Agreement to 
provide a sound basis for strengthened comprehensive bilateral cooperation. An additional Crisis Management 
Agreement allowing Japan to take part in CSDP missions would be a useful complement.
 Translate our ‘shared values’ into concrete common policies or actions drawing on the ‘Poles of attraction 
of the EU for Japan’ and vice versa as outlined in the paper, in particular cooperating together to reinforce 
regional stability and security in Europe and Asia. 
  Working with Japan to make use of the EU’s experience in regional cooperation in overcoming the legacies 
of the past to improve political stability particularly among the three strategic partners of the EU (Japan, 
Republic of Korea, China) and in North East Asia in general.
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Over the course of several decades the relationship between Japan and the EU has 
transformed1 from one focused on economics and trade into one that is a more 
comprehensive and ‚strategic partnership‘2. This has been built on the EU and Japan 
sharing common values, principles and interests. It has also grown as a result of 
globalisation and the new security challenges that both have had to face, although 
the return of geopolitics could shift relations back towards traditional security.
The EU and Japan are presently engaged in comprehensive and ambitious parallel 
negotiations that include a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and an Economic 
Partnership Agreement/Free Trade Agreement. Both have been put in place to make 
up for the elapsed 2001 EU-Japan Action Plan3 and the 2001-2011 Decade of Japan-
Europe Cooperation. In addition to these ‘umbrella’ documents, which provide a 
comprehensive framework for relations, the EU and Japan have concluded a variety 
of specific sectoral agreements on areas such as nuclear energy (1989 and 2006), 
mutual recognition (2001), competition (2003) research (2007 and 2011), customs 
(2008), and legal assistance in criminal matters (2009). At the same time, Japan has 
a mix of bilateral tax and social security agreements with most but not all EU Mem-
ber States; nuclear energy cooperation agreements with Euratom but not on more 
wide-ranging energy cooperation matters such as on renewables or energy security; 
and no agreements at all addressing vital policy areas affecting both partners in the 
21st century such as climate change, international development, financial services 
and cyber-security. There is therefore still a great deal of room for streamlining and 
improvements. 
1. Introduction
EU Security Interests in East Asia: 
Prospects for Comprehensive EU – Japan  
Cooperation beyond Trade and Economics
Michael Reiterer
1 Reiterer, Michael (2013): ‘The EU-Japan relationship in dynamic Asia’ in Joern Keck/Dimitri Vanover-
beke/Franz Waldenberger (eds.) From Confrontation to Global Partnership. EU-Japan Relations from 
1970 to the Treaty of Lisbon and Beyond. Routledge, 2013; pp. 293-328.
2 Reiterer, Michael (2013a): ‘The Role of ‚Strategic Partnerships‘ in the EU‘s Relations with Asia’ in 
Thomas Christiansen/Emil Kirchner/Philomena Murray (eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia 
Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; pp.75-89.
3 Shaping our common future, EU-Japan Action Plan (2001) at http://eeas.europa.eu/japan/docs/ac-
tionplan2001_en.pdf.
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2. The security interests of the EU in East Asia4 
The EU has a large number of security interests in East Asia despite not being a 
party to any territorial or maritime disputes in the region, not participating in the 
Six Party Talks, and having no significant (especially when compared to the USA) 
European or EU military forces there except for some limited British and French 
deployments. East Asia‘s security environment remains volatile and, thanks to glo-
balisation, has the potential to hurt the EU economically.
East Asia is a core part of the wider Asia Pacific region that has become central to 
global prosperity. The region has the world‘s largest population and buys almost a 
quarter of EU exports. It is amongst the fastest growing export markets and is home 
to the fastest growing economies. This has been accompanied by a tremendous 
growth in demand for resources and energy. China alone will account for more than
4 Reiterer, Michael (2014):  ‘The EU‘s comprehensive approach to security in Asia’. European Foreign 
Affairs Review, vol. 19/1, 2014; pp. 1-21.
It is worth recalling in light of ubiquitous talk about China‘s rise, that the EU and 
Japan together account for 30 per cent of the world‘s gross domestic product (GDP) 
and 60 per cent of total official development assistance provided by the members 
of the OECD‘s Development Assistance Committee. Japan is still the world‘s fourth-
largest economy, and the EU‘s second-largest trading partner in Asia after China. 
Japan‘s GDP per capita is still five times that of China.  Furthermore, the Republic of 
Korea is another important strategic partner of the EU and historically and geogra-
phically a bridge between China and Japan. Korea is the only Asian country which 
has concluded with the EU a FTA, a Framework Agreement on political and sectoral 
cooperation, and a framework agreement on crisis management cooperation. 
In light of the aforementioned Japan-EU parallel negotiations, this policy brief fo-
cuses on the political and security aspects of the EU-Japan relationship. This has 
recently undergone further change as Japan has taken steps to strengthen its role in 
international affairs such as re-interpreting Article 9 of its Constitution (which pro-
hibits the use of force other than in self-defence of Japan), establishing a National 
Security Strategy and a National Security Council, and increasing its defence bud-
get. Furthermore, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has expressed not only his intention 
to make a “proactive contribution to peace” but has engaged in an unprecedented 
level of travel diplomacy supported by his foreign minister, courting in particular 
ASEAN countries. 
Japan’s efforts must be seen in the context of the volatile security situation in East 
Asia. China‘s rise has changed power relations across the region, which have heigh-
tened China-Japan maritime disputes and tensions in the East China Sea. Mean-
while relations between Japan and Korea remain contentious as a result of historical 
legacies. Given Europe’s links to East Asia, the EU has a stake in East Asia‘s security 
in much the same way as East Asia has a stake in the security of Europe. This policy 
brief therefore asks whether Japan is a genuine partner for the EU in managing 
relations with the broader region of East Asia and whether Japan regards the EU to 
be a genuine strategic partner.
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5 Asian Development Bank (2011): Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century (Executive Summary); p. 3 at 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/asia2050-executive-summary.pdf 
6 Clinton, Hillary (2011): ‘America‘s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, November 2011.
7 Panetta, Leon (2012):’The 11th IISS Asia Security Summit’, Singapore, at http://www.iiss.org/
conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/first-plenary-session/leon-
panetta/.
8 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003) at http://www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf . The 2008 Report on the implementation of the Strategy deals 
with Central Asia but hardly with the rest of Asia, except a reference to fighting crime in South Asia, 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf  
one-third of increases in global energy demand by 2035. Almost 50 per cent of 
world shipping by tonnage transits the South China Sea, making free navigation of 
it and the East China Sea – both part of the global commons – matters of strategic 
importance to the EU.  The region is home to many natural resources, with the 
importance of rare earths powerfully demonstrated when China introduced export 
limitations which were later defeated in the WTO thanks to joint action by the EU, 
Japan and the USA. The Asian Development Bank announced that the whole of Asia, 
“[b]y nearly doubling its share of global gross domestic production (GDP) to 52 
percent by 2050, … would regain the dominant economic position it held some 300 
years ago, before the industrial revolution.”5 
Despite the rapid economic growth and large-scale investments in one another’s 
economies, there exists something of an ‘Asian paradox’ whereby economic links do 
not prevent strained political relations quickly leading to significant economic costs 
and an escalation in military tensions. This growing economic and security impor-
tance has not passed unnoticed by the USA, with the Obama Administrations ‘pivot’ 
to Asia attracting much comment.6 As US Secretary of Defence Panetta explained, 
“Asia-Pacific contains the world’s largest populations, and the world’s largest milita-
ries. Defense spending in Asia is projected by… the IISS [International Institute for 
Strategic Studies], to surpass that of Europe this year and there is no doubt that it 
will continue to increase in the future.”7 The potential for tensions in the region to 
hurt the EU‘s own interests was demonstrated by the effects of the 2010 earthqua-
ke in Taiwan and the 3/11 triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear melt-down 
in Fukushima) of 2011, both of which had negative impacts on world wide supply 
chains which were felt in Europe. 
The EU’s 2003 ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’, left 
no doubt that the security interests of the EU extend to Asia. As it stated:  
“In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those 
that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South 
Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists 
and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or 
southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens… Our 
history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: 
our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and 
in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we 
should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and 
India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared 
to act in their support.”8
7
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3. The EU‘s approach to security
9 Guidelines on the EU’s foreign and security policy in East Asia (2012), at:    (http://eeas.europa.eu/
asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf.
10 Guidelines on the EU’s foreign and security policy in East Asia (2012), at:    (http://eeas.europa.eu/
asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf.
11 European Union (2012), ‘Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton, on behalf of 
the European Union on recent developments in East Asia‘s maritime areas’, in: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132566.pdf.
12 European Union (2013), ‘Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of 
the European Union on the establishment by China of an ‚East China Sea Air Defence Identification 
Zone‘, in: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139752.pdf.
13 European Union (2013), ‘Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on the visit of Prime Minister Abe to Yasukuni Shrine’, in: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2013/131226_01_en.pdf 
Relations between East Asia and Europe are made more difficult because of the 
contrasting security situations and outlooks. While 1989 marked the beginning of 
the end of a divided Europe, in Asia 1989 is associated with the Tiananmen Square 
incident in China. Asia also remains stuck in the Cold War pattern of division (most 
vividly seen in the Korean Peninsula and in The Straits) and the hub and spoke alli-
ance politics (US security guarantees for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan; treaty alliances 
with Australia, Philippines, Thailand; and cooperation with key partners India, Sin-
gapore, Indonesia; and the ‘foe-friend transformation’ with Vietnam). In line with 
This has been further developed in a series of East Asia Policy Guidelines that have 
reiterated the substantial interests of the EU in the region.9 The Guidelines served as 
guiding principles for strategic talks in 2005 with Japan and the US who at the time 
felt they must educate the Europeans about the region to ensure that the EU’s arms 
embargo against China was not lifted. The 2012 Guidelines include a statement on 
the South China Sea making clear “the great importance of the South China Sea 
for the EU (inter alia in the perspective of promoting the rules-based international 
system, the principles of freedom of navigation, the risk of tensions impacting on 
the consistent increase in trade and investment, with negative consequences for 
all, energy security).”10 They encourage “the parties concerned to resolve disputes 
through peaceful and cooperative solutions and in accordance with international 
law (in particular UNCLOS [UN Convention on the Law of the Sea]).” Baroness Ash-
ton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2010-214), 
re-enforced this message by issuing in September 2012 a separate statement on 
recent developments in East Asia‘s maritime areas in which she also called “on all 
parties to take steps to calm the situation.”11 
In addition to the above mentioned statement, the High Representative made a 
declaration on behalf of the EU12 on the establishment by China in November 2013 
of an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), expressing concern 
about the policy and the “accompanying announcement by the Chinese Ministry 
of Defence of ‘emergency defence measures’ in case of non-compliance.” At the 
same time, the widely criticized December 2013 visit of Prime Minister Abe to the 
Yasukuni Shrine was criticized as “not conducive to lowering tensions in the region 
or to improving relations with Japan‘s neighbours, especially China and Republic of 
Korea.”13
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this Cold War logic, China perceives the US policy of rebalancing as a new variation 
of the containment policy used against the Soviet Union. 
While the EU provides Europe with an institutionalised, supranational structure 
for common policy making that goes beyond dispute avoidance or settlement by 
judicial means, the European security architecture rests on a wider superstructure 
of various organisations with functionally different tasks and different, but often 
overlapping, memberships: the European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE 
and NATO. Asia, including East Asia, has no equivalent ‚superstructure‘ and no un-
derlying canon of common values and ideas like a political ideal for the continent14, 
principled attachment to good governance, rule of law, democracy, or social market 
economy. Furthermore, in addition to the EU‘s own newly introduced obligation to 
support a member state in the case of armed aggression (Art. 42.7), NATO provides 
a transatlantic security umbrella and the OSCE a forum for permanent dialogue. 
Comparable multilateral security structures are largely absent in Asia, although the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) does provide one avenue. 
As a stakeholder in the security of East Asia, the EU maintains traditionally close 
relations with the region through bilateral and multilateral relations. Four out of ten 
of the EU’s strategic partnerships are with Asian countries. ASEAN is a longstanding 
dialogue partner of the EU, with the EU an active participant in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum and signatory to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The EU 
is an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
and a founding participant in the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). As the biggest mar-
ket in the world, the EU is the largest trading and investment partner for most 
countries in the region and therefore actively engaged in negotiating partnership 
and free trade agreements to deepen political as well as economic ties. Furthermo-
re, the Union contributes to the region as a major donor of development assistance.
The EU‘s experiences have led it to develop a holistic approach to crisis manage-
ment and security challenges. This involves all phases of the crisis cycle from pre-
ventive strategies through to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction. To this 
end the EU commits substantial resources to countries in political crisis through its 
country programs and its Instrument for Stability.15 However, the EU’s comprehen-
sive foreign policy is not limited to crisis management, but covers the full range of 
diplomacy, development and defense. This is one of the strong points of EU foreign 
policy, namely an ability to factor sectoral policies, as performed by the European 
Commission, into the overall foreign policy of the EU. This applies to various policy 
areas such as: common trade policy, including the granting and withdrawing of 
Generalised Scheme of Preferences; transfer of technology, coupled with assistance 
to improve intellectual property protection; strategic use of development policy 
(‚differentiation‘) as the EU and its Member States are the largest provider of ODA 
world-wide; energy and energy security policy; fighting climate change; and mig-
ration policy. 
14 Henry Kissinger holds that “‘the East’ … has never been clearly parallel to ‘the West’… Until the 
arrival of modern Western powers, no Asian language had a word for ‘Asia’; none of the peoples 
of what are now Asia’s nearly fifty sovereign states conceived of themselves as inhabiting a single 
‘continent’ or region requiring solidarity with all the others.” Kissinger, Henry (2014): World Order; 
Penguin Press, New York; p. 172.
15 For further details on the Instrument for Stability see: http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index_en.html.
9
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The 2003 EU-Japan Strategic Partnership – ‘Shaping out common future’ – was 
the product of intensified cooperation that had begun in the early 1990s, and in 
particular that which led to the 2001 Agenda for Cooperation. Many of the features 
that were later associated with the strategic partnership were mentioned in the 
2001 agenda, including “shared responsibility to contribute to international peace, 
security and prosperity… solid foundation of common values including a belief in 
peace, freedom, democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and the 
promotion of sustainable development.”16 This approach was endorsed by the 2008 
and 2009 EU-Japan Summits.17 However, the 2010 and 2011 Summit Declaration 
was more guarded, stating that both were, “United by a shared commitment to 
fundamental values and principles, including democracy, the rule of law and hu-
man rights, as well as to the market-based economy and sustainable development, 
and faced with common global challenges, Summit leaders are resolved to deepen 
bilateral relations from a comprehensive and long-term perspective.”18 
The 2013 Summit in Tokyo19 confirmed the crucial importance of the parallel nego-
tiations for an SPA and FTA/EPA by adding cooperation on research and innovation 
projects, and the need to strengthen security cooperation particularly in the areas 
of cyber and space. In 2014, leaders underlined the importance of an early conclu-
sion of a highly comprehensive and ambitious FTA/EPA to encourage a process 
which had not progressed at the anticipated speed. 2014 also saw the revival of a 
pledge to strengthen the ‘Strategic Partnership’, with a new strategic partnership in 
research and innovation added as a goal.20 On this basis, there are on-going efforts 
to politicise the bilateral relationship through replacing the 2001 EU-Japan Action 
Plan with new up-to-date instruments, such as the aforementioned FTA accompa-
nied by a comprehensive SPA, which includes political clauses and non-execution 
provisions of the kind routinely included by the EU in broad agreements intended 
to provide a comprehensive basis for partnership with third countries. This has 
met with a positive reception in Japan as it has created additional opportunities 
for cooperation and a readiness to broaden Japanese foreign policy beyond the 
traditional Asia-Pacific neighborhood. Examples of this have included the Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development (TICAD) that was held for the 
first time in 1993, Japanese military engagement in the Horn of Africa and in the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and initiating in 2003 the International 
Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan. The two guiding foreign 
policy principles, the comprehensive approach for the EU and the “‘panoramic per-
spective of the world map’ that the Abe administration advocates,“21 appear to be 
compatible, which should facilitate collaboration. Japan has therefore enlarged its 
approach, which was for a long time focused on human security.
16 For full details of the 2001 Agend for Cooperation, see: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/
summit/action0112.html.
17 For details of the 2008 and 2009 summits, see: http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/links.php?cat_
id=25&level=0&tree=25&code=4.
18 European Union (2011), ‘20th EU-Japan Summit Brussels, 28 May 2011 Joint Press Statement,’ at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122303.pdf.
19 European Union (2013), ‘21st EU-Japan summit (Tokyo, 19 November 2013) Joint press statement,’ 
at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/139641.pdf.
20 European Union (2014), ‘22nd EU-Japan Summit Brussels, 7 May 2014’, at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/142462.pdf.
4. Cooperation with Japan
10
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5. Challenges
As already noted, it might not be evident that the EU and Japan need to cooperate 
in security matters given the vast geographical distance, the preoccupation of Japan 
with its neighborhood – another common element shared with an EU often accused 
of focusing on Europe and not enough on the rest of the world – and the US-Japan 
security link. Yet history shows the central role security has played in the relation-
ship and the challenges it can pose to it. The EU-Japan strategic dialogues began 
with a focus on Asia against the background of the possible lifting of the EU‘s arms 
embargo against China in 2005. This dialogue has now established itself firmly in 
the bilateral relationship. The aforementioned 2012 East Asia Policy Guidelines have 
further contributed not only to clarifying the EU‘s interest in the region, but also 
demonstrating the EU‘s desire to develop its own role, being neither China nor the 
US and therefore without any claims on any partner in the region. 
As a regional power, albeit with global vocation, the EU has to give priority to its 
neighborhood, whether to the East in terms of Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, 
the Balkans and Central Asia, or to the South with the countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa south of the Sahara whose problems 
drive economic migration to the north. However, with economic might comes glo-
bal responsibility and interests. The security engagement of the EU therefore ext-
ends across Asia and includes operations in Afghanistan, anti-piracy activities off the 
coast of Somalia, political engagement in Aceh and Mindanao, and strongly support 
for Burma/Myanmar in its transition process to democracy.
Japan, as the first ‘Westernised’ country in Asia – the first to join the OECD, the only 
Asian country in the G7/G8, a special ally of the US profiting from its nuclear secu-
rity umbrella – has a long-standing tradition of working with European countries 
which goes back centuries. As one Japanese commentator pointed out: “The fact of 
the matter is that, besides the US, Australia, India, the Republic of Korea, many of 
the world’s major powers that possess the will and capacity to fulfil their responsi-
bility in terms of international relations and security, and that also share the same 
values as Japan, reside in Europe.”22
21 Kishida, Fumio (2015) Keynote address at the Japan Trilateral Forum, Brussels ‘Year 2015 as the 
opening of a new chapter in Japan-Europa relations, at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000065781.pdf.
11
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6. Poles of attraction of the EU for Japan
22 Tsuruoka, Michito (2011): ‘Japan Europe Security Cooperation: How to ‘Use’ NATO and the EU’. 
NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, no. 12 (December 2011), at: http://www.nids.go.jp/english/
publication/kiyo/pdf/2011/bulletin_e2011_3.pdf.
23 See also Reiterer, Michael (2006): ‘Japan and the European Union: shared foreign policy interests’, 
Asia Europe Journal, no. 4; pp. 344-348.
24 Hosoya, Yuichi (2012): ‘The evolution of the EU-Japan relationship: towards a ‘normative partner-
ship’?’ Japan Forum, 24:3; pp. 317-337. 
There are a number of areas for EU-Japan cooperation:23
 
• As the world’s largest economy the EU is an important contributor to global 
rules and norms setting. Joint efforts could increase the effectiveness of this.  
• The EU’s collective vote of 28 countries in international organizations, inclu-
ding two permanent members and some rotating members of the UN Security 
Council.
• Given their similar interests and values, the EU is a potential partner for sup-
porting Japanese positions on issues such as sea-lanes, human rights, inter-
national norms,24 and fostering inter-regionalism as an expression of effective 
multilateralism.
• The EU’s approach to maritime disputes strengthens Japan’s position in the 
East and South China Seas. The EU‘s approach emphasizes the rule of law and 
diplomacy, whereby parties clarify the basis for their claims. It condemns any 
unilateral pressure or threat, instead asking parties to undertake confidence 
and trust building measures. This approach complements the hard power sup-
port granted by the USA.
• Concerned by the military build-up of China, Japan, with strong support from 
the US, wants the EU to maintain its arms embargo on China, even if it is of a 
more symbolic nature. At the same time, Japan is becoming more flexible in its 
own arms trade and wants to participate in the joint development of military 
technologies with third countries.
• The EU has acquired a certain distinct identity, different from the US and China, 
which makes it an alternative pole in an increasingly multipolar world. The EU‘s 
approach to security makes it an alternative partner. The EU‘s expertise and 
interests in its larger neighborhood is recognized, albeit as one tested recently 
by developments in Ukraine.
• The focus of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’s (CSDP) missions 
on civilian aspects of security makes the EU a genuine partner for Japan‘s inter-
national engagement, especially after the 2014 re-interpretation of Art. 9 of its 
Constitution. Establishing a framework agreement with the EU, similar to the 
one concluded with the Republic of Korea, could facilitate EU-Japan defence 
cooperation. 
• Defence cooperation could lead to operations similar to the operation ATALAN-
TA counter-piracy mission that has served as a trust building measure between 
the EU, China and Japan. Cooperation in areas such as the Sahel and Maghreb 
region could facilitate defence cooperation with Korea and would raise fewer 
security suspicions amongst Japan’s neighbors. 
• Talks with Iran under EU-3 leadership could serve as an experience to be ap-
plied to talks with North Korea, creating a more stable region, and potentially 
12
                                                                                               EU Security Interests in East Asia: 
Prospects for comprehensive EU – Japan cooperation beyond trade and economics
facilitating DPRK-Japan bilateral talks on matters such as the DPRK’s abduction 
of Japanese citizens. This could lead to cooperation on stabilizing fragile and 
failed states in other areas of Asia or Africa. 
• The EU‘s support for the Korean North East Asian Peace and Cooperation Initia-
tive, and the Trilateral Cooperation of Korea-China-Japan, demonstrate the EU’s 
commitment to issues of direct concern to Japan.
• The EU-Japan strategic relationship could be extended to include Korea, which 
might be more palatable for China than enhanced Japan-Korea-US cooperation.
• On the other hand, as allies of the US, the EU and Japan could enhance trilateral 
cooperation with the USA, perhaps returning to the long-standing ideas of the 
Trilateral Commission.25 This would fit into the ongoing trade negotiations for 
a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP), both of which could have an immense impact on international 
economic governance.
• The EU and its treaties (cf. Art. 21.1 TEU) approach international relations with 
a commitment to the rule of law, democracy, human rights and peaceful sett-
lement of disputes. Therefore, the EU is a staunch supporter of the rules based 
multilateral trading system under the auspices of the WTO, which allows decou-
pling of political tensions from the conduct of economic relations. This will be 
of particular importance given that interdependence means that spillover from 
economics to security issues should be avoided. Such policies are in line with 
Japan‘s professed policy of making a “proactive contribution to peace based on 
the principle of international cooperation.” 
• Both partners share an interest in strengthening the regional security architec-
ture in order to enable multilateralism and the rule of law to play a more im-
portant role, especially for managing and settling tensions and disputes. Both 
sides recognise the importance of ASEAN in this context. The EU‘s experience 
in transforming the war-stricken European continent into a peaceful one could 
provide a basis for working together, with Japan helping to translate the mes-
sage into an East Asian context. 
• European experiences in dealing with historical sensitivities and managing na-
tionalism could be an asset for Japan. The 2015 anniversaries – 70 years after 
the end of World War II, 50 years of diplomatic relations between Japan and 
Korea – will need careful handling to ensure they will be positive steps towards 
overcoming the legacies of the past.
• The European experience of setting up a network of overlapping regional ins-
titutions and organisations that allow states to manage their relations with one 
another in times of crisis could be another asset. The politics of East Asia means 
it is important that states in the region have the means by which to explain po-
licies to avoid misconceptions. This includes transparency, especially in military 
expenses. China’s non-transparency in this regard is one of the factors behind 
insecurity and concern in the region. 
• Further strengthening cooperation in forums such as ARF and ASEM.  
• Japan‘s support26 of the EU‘s quest to join the East Asia Summit, which would 
allow the EU to potentially become more involved in security matters at the level 
of leaders alongside the ASEAN Defence Ministers‘ Meeting Plus, is a first step 
with others to follow.
25 For further details of the Trilateral Commission see: www.trilateral.org.
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7. Poles of attraction of Japan for the EU
While most of the attractions discussed in the previous section work both ways and 
not only as a one-way street, it is worth outlining that Japan: 
• Is the fourth largest global economy with highly innovative companies and first 
class science and technology institutions;
• Is one of the largest ODA donors offering a great deal of cooperation with the 
EU and its Member States who are collectively the world’s largest donor;
• Is one of the few strategic partners with whom the EU shares many values and 
with whom it can set norms in important new areas;
• Is an advanced democracy with whom the EU can work together in the context 
of the G7 in preparation for advancing common agendas in the G20;
• Can offer insights into East Asia, in particular on China, with whom it is deeply 
connected in investment and human networks, despite on-going tensions.
8. The strategic importance of the Agreements 
under negotiation
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement will be of particular importance to 
developing the bilateral architecture of the partnership and so bringing together 
the different strands of the relationship. It has the potential to provide a simpler, 
more consistent and comprehensive framework for bilateral relations that will not 
only codify existing arrangements, but also provide a sustainable basis for adapt-
ing the relationship over the next few decades. Compared to an action plan it will 
therefore not be limited by a specific timeframe. The SPA will be a legally binding 
framework that covers political matters. For example, it will set out arrangements 
for meetings between leaders, and set out the work on areas such as shared prin-
ciples (human rights and democracy), security cooperation (dealing with such topics 
as weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons) and non-traditional 
security threats (such as cyber or pandemics). This will be complemented by sectoral 
cooperation in areas of common interest such as science and technology, health, 
transport, agriculture, energy, taxation, environment, consumer protection, data 
protection climate change, development, disaster management, justice and home 
affairs matters, and issues related to the United Nations. 
The negotiating process will pose challenges. While the EU has considerable expe-
rience of negotiating such comprehensive agreements with third countries, this is 
the first time that Japan has negotiated a general – as opposed to sector-specific 
26 “Japan welcomed the EU’s continued interest on greater involvement in the East Asia Summit, 
and took note of the EU’s willingness to contribute to the evolution of the institutional architecture 
of cooperation in the region.” Quoted from European Union, ‘21st EU-Japan summit (Tokyo, 19 
November 2013), Joint press statement’, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/139641.pdf.
14
                                                                                               EU Security Interests in East Asia: 
Prospects for comprehensive EU – Japan cooperation beyond trade and economics
– legally-binding, political agreement. In addition, the EU’s ‘sui generis’ nature me-
ans the issue of competences – whether powers are held by the EU, shared with 
member states, or held only the member states – often creates problems as they are 
not readily understandable to outsiders. The EU and Japan also have different legal 
traditions and approaches that will need to be dealt with before consensus can be 
reached in all areas, especially on setting up an institutional framework linking the 
FTA and SPA. 
An obstacle facing the EU is its treaty-based requirement to conduct a principled 
foreign policy (Art. 21.1 TFEU). This requires the EU to stipulate in all agreements 
a respect for human rights and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, as well as find a mechanism to link these political principles to the EU‘s tra-
ding concessions. This inclusion poses a special problem, not only with Japan but 
also with other like-minded and strategic partners such as South Korea, Singapore, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other South East Asian countries with which 
negotiations have been concluded or are ongoing. While this approach may be a 
legal requirement of the EU, it has been contested by some of the EU‘s partners 
including Japan. They have not only questioned the value but also the need and 
appropriateness of this approach in view of the long history of democracy and hu-
man rights in their countries. This is indeed the case, but it is precisely because 
allies, partners and like-minded countries adhere to these universal values that the 
EU seeks to enshrine them in its agreements with third countries, whether they be 
OECD states or Least Developed Countries (LDCs). From the EU’s perspective, this 
should lead over time to the establishment of international minimum standards 
that thanks to the prospect of access to a network of relations between the largest 
economies in the world should eventually bind those countries which do not cur-
rently adhere to them. 
9. Conclusions
Intensifying cooperation and developing a joint framework requires both Japan and 
the EU to define a coherent policy in relation to each other in order to add a sense 
of purpose which would help overcome an “expectation deficit in EU-Japan rela-
tions.”27 This deficit develops when the partners develop a perception that the other 
either cannot live up to its announcements or pursues security interests which are 
only of major concern to it. As demonstrated, the EU has already outlined its ideas 
in its 2012 Guidelines, started negotiations on a deep and comprehensive FTA and 
SPA covering political, global and other sectoral agreements. This should also sup-
port and facilitate engagement with Japan in areas of common interest outside of 
Asia, for example over Iran, on non-proliferation of WMD, and issues connected to 
instability in areas of Africa. As primarily civilian powers, the EU and Japan have a 
similar approach to international relations whereby they focus on soft/smart power 
27 Tsuruoka, Michito (2013): ‘The EU and Japan: making the most of each other’. European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, Alert 36; p.2.
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elements and pay special attention to human security issues.28 This should provide 
a basis for some common positions. The relevance of the EU for Japan has also 
increased in light of Japan‘s renewed efforts to play a more active and independent 
role in foreign policy in the face of the competitive and rather unstable environ-
ment characterised by the China-US-Japan relationship. The EU‘s principled policy 
of advocating the rule of law also aligns with Japan‘s interests as well as those of 
other states involved in maritime and territorial disputes. 
   
As a partner of the US and Japan, the EU advocates an open network diplomacy and 
effective multilateralism, having learned from European history that the balance of 
power embedded in alliances and pacts brings war and devastation. Having gone 
through a difficult process of soul searching and reconciliation, the members of 
the EU seek to work with their friends and allies to share their experiences. The EU 
has no territorial or great power ambitions in East Asia, is not acting on behalf of 
anybody else, but is ready to share its experiences of institution building, respect 
for the rule of law, work to protect the global commons, and processes of reconci-
liation.
The November 2014 EU Foreign Affairs Council re-iterated that, “the urgent need of 
enabling the EU and its Member States to assume increased responsibilities to act 
as a security provider, at the international level and in particular in the neighbour-
hood, thereby also enhancing their own security and their global strategic role by 
responding to these challenges together.”  Recognising that regional conflicts risk 
spilling over into the global system, the Asia Pacific region is of direct and indirect 
concern for the EU. As a result the EU has attempted to use its influence in East 
Asia to promote good co-operative relations among the key players and encourage 
all sides to refrain from actions that could be misperceived by others in the region. 
This goal has become particularly important given the maritime and territorial dis-
putes that have led to increased tensions. 
The involvement of three strategic partners of the EU – Japan, China, South Korea – 
with the interests of two more strategic partners – the US and Russia – also at stake, 
renders any EU-initiative particularly delicate and sensitive to scrutiny by all five 
partners. Rendering this web of relationships mutually supportive could help crea-
te trust and means for cooperation, especially in North East Asia. Based on closer 
cooperation, Japan could be a valuable partner to further EU actions and initiatives. 
The EU would like to help enhance security and prosperity through its economic 
presence in the region, and by offering its unique experiences of post-war recon-
ciliation and economic integration as an example of the value of a regional legal 
dispute resolution system for diffusing political tensions. It also seeks to share its 
experiences in joint sustainable management of shared natural resources. These 
features, still underdeveloped in the East Asia region, contributed to the awarding 
of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the EU.
Speaking in Paris in 2000, the then Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei laid the 
foundation for Japan-EU political cooperation when he advocated a millennium 
28 López i Vidal, Lluc (2012): ‘Contemporary political relations between Europe and Japan: beyond 
the weak link approach’ in Contemporary political relations between Europe and Japan, Brussels: 
Intercultural Research Center, Kobe University; pp. 99-109 at http://web.cla.kobe-u.ac.jp/group/IReC/
pdf/20120306_vidal.pdf.
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partnership and cooperation that went beyond trade and economics.  His speech, 
which talked of the relationship almost exclusively in political and not economic 
terms, was almost revolutionary. The process now being taken forward, namely to 
renew the basis of mutual cooperation after the end of the 2001 Action Plan, the 
successful conclusion of the parallel negotiations, and cooperation in the areas out-
lined above, offer the possibility to upgrade, broaden and solidify the EU-Japan re-
lationship in order to provide the ‘proactive pacifism’  advocated by Prime Minster 
Abe. This would provide the partnership of former Foreign Minister Kono‘s vision. 
The EU and Japan have come a long way, changing the relationship from one do-
minated by trade disputes to a more comprehensive one where the lack of disputes 
has been equated with a relationship of benign neglect. Since 2012 the EU has been 
particularly active in Asia in terms of high level visits, participation in important 
events (for example at ASEM Summits, the ARF, and Shangri-La Dialogue), and 
signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. All of these should have an impact 
on views of the EU in Asia and in Japan in particular, moving away from one where 
economics is the dominant theme.  
Finally, concluding the negotiations on the FTA and the SPA would not only 
strengthen the bilateral relationship by giving the relationship direction and pur-
pose. It would also contribute to the formation of rules on global governance, espe-
cially through agreements on standards. This could increase Japan‘s special status 
as a strategic partner of choice and bind the EU and Japan into an institutionalised 
framework as nations that share common values. This would finally tap the relati-
onships untapped potential , particularly if supported by a common public diplo-
macy effort. Foreign Minister Kishida‘s 2015 Brussels address  in which he outlined 
three pillars for Japan‘s policy towards Europe – cooperation for global peace and 
stability; addressing global challenges together; promoting economic partnership 
– reflects a comprehensive approach and therefore represents an important step in 
this direction.
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